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LIBERALISM AND THE CHARTER: FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
TERRY SHEPPARDt

Liberalism, for the most part, has been opposed to unions because they are
perceived to be opposed to individualism and detrimental to the free market.
This paper will attempt to show how union rights, and more particularly the
right to strike, can be accomodated in the liberal philosophy. As a preliminary
matter, some principal tenets of liberal theory are examined: ethical
individualism; the concept of liberty as negative liberty; the focus on
individuals rather than groups as the locus of rights; and a desire to restrain
the actions ofgovernment. The paper then proceeds to use liberal philosophy
to critique decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada denying Charter
protection to the right to strike. The right to strike, it is concluded, is more
aptly phrased a freedom to strike. As such, government interventions to
prevent stirikes should be viewed and criticized by liberals as an illicit
government intervention in the free market.
Le libtralisme s 'oppose aux syndicats parce qu 'on les regarde com me
s 'opposant a l'individualisme et comme nuisant au march/ fibre. Cet article
va essayer de demontrer comment !es droits des syndicats, et particulierement
le droit de greve, peuvent s'integrer dans la philosophie libtrale. Pour
commencer, !'auteur examine !es idees principaux de la theorie liberale:
l'individualisme ithique; l'idee de la liberte comme itant la liberte negative;
l'idee que !es droits apartiennent aux individus et pas aux groupes; et un desir
de restreindre !es actions des gouvernements. L 'article continue en utilisant la
theorie liberale pour critiquer les arrets de la Cour supreme du Canada qui
en/eve au droit de greve la protection de la Charte. Le droit de greve peut
selon !'auteur mieux se caracteriser comme etant une liberti de greve. Par
consequent, d'un point de vue liberal, on devrait critiquer !es decisions des
gouvernments d'interdire les greves comme constituant une intervention
illicite dans le march/ fibre.

B.A., M.A. (Dalhousie), L.L.B (Dalhousie) anticipated 1997.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The liberals can understand everything but people who
don't understand them.
Lenny Bruce
The place of unions in various political theories has always been one
of perplexity. Marx, for example, praised them on the one hand as
expediting the condition of workers, and believed anything that
helped workers was praiseworthy. On the other hand, he severely
criticized them for alleviating only the most obvious and superficial
contradictions of bourgeois society, leaving the worker more
content with his lot in the capitalist order and less likely to revolt
against the more philosophic, and profound, alienation that could
not be alleviated by an increase in take-home pay. 1 Socialism, as we
shall see, has been caught in this internal debate over the merits of
unionism and statism. Liberalism, for the most part, has been
opposed to unions because they are perceived to be opposed to
individualism and detrimental to the free market. However, more
than any other theory, liberalism has the potential for change and
growth.
The word "liberal" is often used in common speech to connote
someone who is generous or open-minded, such as when it is said
"So-and-so is liberal-minded on gay rights" or "So-and-so is liberal
with her money." Politically, the common usage of the word,
especially in North America, often implies someone who is "left-ofcentre." These are not the liberals to whom I am referring or
addressing. Attempts to partition liberalism philosophically into its
various sects are always difficult. Generally speaking there is a
divide between the so-called welfare liberals-LT. Hobhouse, T.H.
Greene and John Maynard Keynes-and the classical, or neoclassical liberals-Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick and Milton
Friedman. What these two groups of liberals share, in the most
basic terms, is a belief that the political structure should be based
upon the individual, with each individual possessing a maximum
amount of liberty. What divides them is more complicated.
Questions about the extent of the state's role in providing for
individual needs, positive versus negative rights and the nature of
1

For Marx's views on trade unions, see Part I of the Communist Manifesto and
Capital chapter 6.
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equality provoke different answers from each camp. The welfare
liberals would allow for a relatively larger role for government in the
form of social programmes, support both positive and negative
rights, and argue for more than a political formulation of equality.
Classical liberals, on the other hand, would minimize the role of
government, support negative rights and adhere to a pared-down
definition of equality. Classical liberals primarily define liberty in
terms of how free individuals are from state interference.
Carmichael characterizes the classical liberal view of liberty as
"understood primarily in legal institutional terms as the extent to
which each individual is free from state control. Thus individual
autonomy requires that the state be kept out of the individual's life
to the greatest extent possible." 2 Welfare liberals wish to provide the
necessities of life to those who cannot provide for themselves. In
order to provide these necessities, the state must extend its control
and interfere, primarily in the form of increased taxes, with the
liberty of others. On the question of equality, classical liberals
believe that as long as all the laws apply equally to all, individuals
are equal. Welfare liberals are more open to the argument that
certain groups within society have been disadvantaged, including
women and minorities, and still have an unequal status despite the
fact that legalistically all the laws apply to everyone. For the
purposes of brevity, I will generally refer to classical liberals simply
as liberals.
Over the past few centuries, since the formation of trade guilds,
the precursors of unions, the fortunes of unions have waxed and
waned. Unions reached their peak in the latter part of the
nineteenth century when much pro-union legislation was passed in
industrialized nations. The twentieth century has been witness to
the pre-Depression height of capitalism, the turbulent years of the
Depression, and then the post-Depression growth of unions. In the
last decade or so there has been a marked decline in the influence of
unions. Margaret Thatcher's victory in Britain in 1979 was largely
due to her promise to break the unions, a promise she kept with
enthusiasm. Thatcher went on to win subsequent election victories.

2 D. ]. C. Carmichael, "Political Ideologies and Values" in T.C. Pocklington, ed.,
Liberal Democracy in Canada and the United States: An Introduction to Politics and
Government, (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985) at 64. Carmichael
refers to this form of liberalism as 'Traditional Liberalism'.
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In 1980, another victory for the anti-unionist forces came with the
election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States, his reelection in 1984 and the continuation of Republican policies in
1988 under his successor, George Bush. These trends were matched
in Canada when the Progressive Conservatives, under the leadership
of Mulroney, took office and were re-elected in 1988.
The force behind these election victories was the reemergence of
classical liberalism. It is no coincidence that pillars of classical
liberalism, including the ideas of F. A. Hayek, regained popularity
and influence during this period. The influence of classical liberal
ideology can be seen in political platforms and policies, from
privatization to supply-side economics. For the most part, the
public has actively supported these free-market, governmentconstricting measures.
Much of the ideology of liberalism is now so instilled in the
minds of the public that it would be impossible for it to be
completely reversed. For example I believe that the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms contributed significantly to the rejection of the
Charlottetown Constitutional Accord, although this is a very
debatable argument. The proposed amendments to the
Constitution that were contained in the Accord were rejected in the
1992 referendum because much of the Charter is of liberal
inspiration and, more importantly, the public perception of the
Charter is of a document which entrenches their individual
equality. What the Charlottetown Accord threatened to do, in the
minds of English Canadians, was repeal that equality and bestow
upon Quebecers special favour. If the same document had been
proposed prior to the Charter, it may very well have passed a
referendum. In this way, the Charter has instilled in the public an
awareness of their individual rights that cannot be reversed with the
comings and goings of the political parties. Regardless of whether
my assessment of the failure of the Charlottetown Accord is
correct, the point remains that liberal principles are still firmly
entrenched in the ideology of the western, industrialized nations.
Many people who endorse the rights of unions have taken the
position that liberalism is a complete anathema to the cause of
unions. Much of the efforts of union members are directed at
defeating liberal theories and substituting them with theories more
sympathetic to their cause, usually socialist or watered-down
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versions dressed up in individualist garb and labeled "modern
liberalism." Over the past decade, these efforts have largely failed.
The purpose of this work is not so much to critique liberalism as
it is to recognize liberalism as the dominant political theory of the
times. That liberalism is here to stay, however, does not mean that
unions must inevitably disintegrate into atomistic fragments. I
believe it is possible to incorporate a strong argument for union
rights within the liberal ethos. Labour supporters who continue to
proffer socialism as their salvation do so at their own expense. Not
only is the liberal-minded public unlikely to accept socialism in the
foreseeable future, but it is questionable whether this will advance
the cause of unions. By working within the liberal framework,
unionists can more effectively build a case for their rights.
The task, then, is to show how union rights, particularly the
right to strike, can be accommodated within liberalism. Critics may
charge that I am tying liberalism to a Procrustean bed, but I believe
that many liberals dismiss unions out of hand without giving them
enough consideration. The first section of the thesis will lay the
philosophical groundwork for the arguments to follow. The
relationship between individuals and groups, negative rights, the
role of government, and the moral imperative of liberalism will be
examined. Then, in the remaining two sections, the practical
applications of this theory for the Charter and the judiciary are
examined. The most effective avenue for attaining union rights is
through the Charter and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
has already given its decision on the matter and it was not
favourable. Much of the Court's narrow rejection of the right to
strike was due to a perception that union rights seemed too far out
of line with the liberal spirit of the Charter and the times. The hope
is that in applying the principles expounded in the first two chapters
to these court decisions it can be shown that union rights are not
out of place within a liberal context.
There are several reasons why I believe a Supreme Court
decision would be most effective in securing union rights. Although
the Supreme Court has already rejected the right to strike, they are
able to reverse previous decisions. The alternative to a judicial
remedy is to argue for government legislation, and liberals have
never been fond of seeking government action. Union rights could
be legislated but provincial legislation would be patchwork at best.
Some employees are regulated by the federal government but the
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Conservatives and Liberals are unlikely to pass such legislation and
the New Democrats are unlikely to gain power. Even if wide
sweeping legislation were passed, its continued existence would be
at the whim of future legislators. Only a Supreme Court decision is
likely to have the desired national and long-lasting effects.
The approach will be a gradual one, starting with the most
defensible scenarios where unions are needed to correct market
deficiencies. Building from this, I will argue that there is a need
within the general economy for unions. The most contentious
argument will be with regard to public sector employees. The final
step will be to look at those employees whose work falls into the
category of "essential services." The characterization of services as
"essential services" has been used to deny the right to strike to
workers ranging from dairy workers to doctors. The argument that
will be presented will tie the definition of essential services to the
irreplaceabilty of the service or good being provided.
The first task is to provide an understanding of liberalism. My
presentation of liberalism is selective in the sense that I emphasize
the aspects of it that relate most directly to unions. In the section
that follows, unions will not be mentioned directly. The purpose is
not so much to give normative arguments but rather to set the
grounds for the argument to follow.

I. LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY
The Stamper mills were in absolute fact, by Jesus,
contracted to supply Wakonda Pacific with lumber. No
damn wonder old man Jerome or the rest of the WP
bunch hadn't been sweating the month-long walkout.
The boys could strike till hell froze shut and it sure
wouldn't be hurting profits. Not as long as Stamper and
his scabby kind were cutting for them!

***
"Had a lotta logs to cut, Big."[said Hank Stamper] ... "Ah,
now, Big, don't be like that ... You know how ol'Floyd
[the union president] likes to blow things up; I ain't
keeping you out of work. As a matter of fact I hear
they're jumping up and down for men out at WP. I hear
there was a bunch of fellows walked out on a strike or
something like that, y'know?" ... "You don't say so, Big.

LIBERALISM AND THE CHARTER

123

My, but that's a shame" .... "If that's how you feel about
it, Big, ol' buddy, then I'm ready any time you are."
Ken Kesey, Sometimes a Great Nation
1. Ethical Individualism
Nozick writes, "Individuals have rights, and there are things no
person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."
One implication of this is that "the state may not use its coercive
apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others."3
For liberals, this would mean primarily that tax dollars could not be
spent on any welfare legislation from university bursaries to social
assistance; however, it would also mean that Good Samaritan laws
violate individual rights. But it is not only the destitute and needy
whom the state assists. The government also uses tax dollars to
support such things as the performing arts, the clientele of which is
often very wealthy. Any legislation or use of tax dollars that assists
citizens in achieving their goals or aims (outside the minimal
functions of the state-protection against force, theft, fraud, etc.) is
beyond the purview of the state.
Nozick's position seems austere; yet there are others who go
even further than this. There is the example of the little old lady
who has fallen on the side of the road and cannot get up, whom I
can help with little inconvenience and no benefit to myself. The
Nozickian position would prohibit the state from forcing me to
render assistance, but would not prevent me from voluntarily
helping her. Egoists, however, argue that all human action is guided
by self-interest. Hobbes writes, "Of the voluntary acts of every
man, the object is always some good to himself," 4 denying that
anyone can act out of pure altruism.
What liberals do have in common is a belief that individuals
should pursue their own self-interest without the coerced aid of
others. Although self-interest may not guide all our conduct, it
ought to be our primary motive, especially in economic decisions.

3

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) at

IX.
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. Michael Oakshotte, intro. Richard Peters
(London: Collier Books, 1962) at 106. Other psychological egoists include B. F.
Skinner and Nietzsche, although Nietzsche explicitly rejects it (but then again,
Nietzsche rejects everything).
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In other words, I do not help the little, old lady across the road
because I hope that someday she will do the same for me, or that
she will tip me for helping her; but, when I purchase a new product,
I ought to look for the best price and not pay the merchant an
especially high price just because I am a nice guy. Likewise, if I offer
an exorbitant price, the merchant is under no obligation to set a
lower price.5 Most importantly, the government cannot set the price
of the product, enact a law forcing merchants to disclose to all
customers the fair price, or use tax dollars to help me purchase the
product.
Liberals offer a variety of reasons for disallowing the state from
assisting its citizens in achieving their ends. Some believe the state is
simply inefficient at allocating resources in this way and that
voluntary, free market solutions are more effective. Others believe
that when the government assists its citizens, it is placed in the
position of moral legislator, a dangerous and wholly inappropriate
role for the state. This leaves open the possibility of empirical
evidence showing the efficiency of government in these projects,
and arguments that the government can legislate a Good Samaritan
law without setting up a state religion. Still, liberals would be
unconvinced. They argue that coerced assistance destroys the moral
value of charity. An act done under force cannot have any worth.
When citizens merely hand over their tax dollars to be disposed of
as the government sees fit, they are being treated as a means to
someone else's ends. And, as Kant wrote, you must always "act so
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only." 6 The choice
of whom to help is being taken away from the individual. Each
individual is their own best judge of which cause needs assistance
and only when they voluntarily support that cause with their own
funds, and not because the greater community tells them to, is that
action morally worthy.

5 Unless, of course, she wishes my repeat business and fears I will discover my
error. In which case, it would be in her self-interest to tell me.
6 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of Metaphysics and Morals, trans. Lewis White
Beck (London: Collier Books, 1990) at 46.
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2. Freedoms and Rights

This is closely related to the liberal conception of freedom. For the
liberal, freedom is primarily negative in the sense that it is a right of
non-interference. Hobbes defined freedom as "the absence of
opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of
motion." 7 Individuals have the right to do whatever it is they wish
to do so long as it does not infringe upon the liberty of others. The
individual cannot be coerced into doing anything she does not wish
to do, nor can she be prevented from anything that does not
interfere with others. Isaiah Berlin aptly defines this notion of
negative liberty when he writes, "I am normally said to be free to
the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my
activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which
a man can act unobstructed by others." 8 Coercion, then, "implies
the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in
which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom
only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by other human
beings." 9
This is the only type of liberty a liberal will uphold. In contrast
to this negative conception, many have argued for a positive
formulation of freedom. 10 I have the freedom from interference
with my life, meaning that no one is allowed to murder me but I
do not have a right to life in the sense that if I do not have the
sustenance to maintain my life, I do not have the right to
appropriate someone else's food. Under negative liberty, I am
prohibited from killing the starving man, but I am not obliged to
provide him with food. This ties in with the moral responsibility
inherent within individualism because the onus is upon the
individual to provide for him or herself. Most liberals would allow
me to voluntarily feed the starving man, 11 but he could never have a

7
8

Leviathan, supra note 4 at 159.
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969)

at 122.
9

Ibid

See e.g. Charles Taylor's, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty," in Alan
Ryan, ed., The Idea ofFreedom: Essays in Honour ofIsaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979) at 175.
11 Rousseau, for example, believed there was a natural inclination to help those in
trouble, especially those who are similar to us. See The Social Contract (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1967).
IO
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right-claim to my food. Some liberals, however, follow a more
Spencerian line and would argue that in allowing only the
economically fit to survive, this would provide for the progress of
civilization. Spencer writes:
Pervading all nature we may see at work a stern
discipline, which is a little cruel so that it may be very
kind ... The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that
come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle ...
are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence ... It
seems hard that widows and orphans should be left to
struggle for life and death. Nevertheless, when regarded
not separately, but in connection with the interests of
universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to be
full of the highest beneficence the same beneficence
which brings to early graves the children of diseased
parents, and singles out the low-spirited, the intemperate,
and the debilitated as the victims of an epidemic. 12

Aside from this extreme view, most liberals argue that the free
market will in fact decrease poverty and for those who are still
unable to provide for themselves, such as the sick and handicapped
for example, voluntary acts of charity will be more effective than
coercive government action. It should be noted that liberals will
uphold this view of freedom even in the face of dire consequences.
There is a caveat to my presentation of liberalism that should be
discussed. Singer gives a convincing argument that there is no
significant, relevant difference between acts and omissions. 13 The
argument is that if I fail to wade into a pool to save a drowning
child, then I am equally responsible for the death by my omission
as I am if I had acted to push the child into the pool. The
distinction is an important one because it highlights two distinct
factions among adherents of classical liberalism. Some liberals
defend liberty on utilitarian grounds, arguing that the more
freedom a society enjoys, the better off that society is. Rule

Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, quoted in J. Schapiro, Liberalism: Its Meaning
and History, (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1958) at 137.
l3 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979) at chap. 7.
12
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utilitarians, such as Hayek, 14 might defend a rule that would
compel a person to help the drowning child. For these liberals, the
rule "Always help drowning children out of pools," might be shown
to maximize utility and thus would be a justifiable rule. On the
other hand, there is a school of liberalism which adopts a strict
natural rights approach and argues that liberty is an intrinsic good
not dependent on its utilitarian value. 15 The natural rights liberals
would argue that the individual should never be coerced to render
assistance to anyone. 16 Those who take the natural rights approach
argue that if liberty is extrinsic to some other primary good,
happiness for example, then it leaves the way open for some serious
limitations to personal liberty. Only when liberty is taken as the
primary good, with all other goods extrinsic to it, is freedom
secured.
There is also a debate within liberalism over what constitutes
coercion. If I own the only oasis in the desert, or am the only
doctor in town, would I be using coercion if I charged an
unreasonable price for the water or my services as a doctor? Hayek 17
believes this is coercive while Rothbard 18 asserts that it is not. Other
liberals get around these difficulties by appealing to the Lockean
proviso. Locke defends property rights by saying that "whatsoever
then he removes from the state that nature has provided and left it
in, he has mixed his labour with, and joined to it something which
is his, and thereby makes it his property," but then qualifies this by
saying "at least where there is enough and as good left in common
for others." 19 This proviso by Locke avoids the difficulties of the

14

Hayek's argument is much more complicated than I present here. He does
argue that liberty can also be defended on moral grounds and he is not a strict
utilitarian.
l5 See e.g. Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, (Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press, 1982).
16 Another way of framing the distinction is to say that some liberals are
deontological liberals while others are teleological liberals; but, this language does
not quite get at the distinction I wish to make here.
l7 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960) at 136.
18 The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 15. See also: Ronald Hamowy, "Hayek's
Concept of Freedom: A Critique" New Individualist Review, (April, 1961) at 2831.
l9 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1952) §27 at 17.
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oasis-like scenarios by providing that a person cannot monopolize a
necessary resource. Nozick agrees with the Lockean proviso in so far
as "A theory of appropriation incorporating the Lockean proviso
will handle correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the
proviso) where someone appropriates the total supply of something
necessary for life;" 20 but, he also believes "that the free operation of
the market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean
proviso. . . . If this is correct, the proviso will not play a very
important role in the activities of protective agencies and will not
provide a significant opportunity for future state activity." 21
All this being said, liberals adhere to a fairly strict conception of
negative, individual rights. Individuals set about the task of
achieving their goals, whether it is obtaining a university degree or
mere survival, with only themselves and their own wares to rely
upon. They have no claims to the property or to the assistance of
their fellow citizens. Most important is the very restrictive role this
allows for the government. The state is limited to preventing others
from interfering with my autonomy as I go about achieving my
ends and can do little to aid me in achieving these ends. Most
often, the liberal's freedom from is freedom from government
interference.
But many of my goals simply cannot be achieved in isolation
from others. Does the liberal conception of individualism compel
me to strive only for those ends that can be accomplished by me
alone? Indeed, if liberalism meant this, it would be a very unpopular
and ineffective theory. The role groups play in liberal theory and
the ends that may be accomplished through them is the next step in
understanding liberalism.
3. Individuals v. Groups
Because individualism is one of its key components, liberalism has
often been viewed as opposed to groups. The romantic notion of
liberalism is of the strong individual, breaking away from the group
and going it on his own. The image is of John Galt walking out of
the factory, 22 or Hank Stamper floating down the turbulent river on

20

Anarchy, State and Utopia, supra note 3 at 178-179.
Ibid. at 182.
22 See Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, (New York: Signet, 1975).
21
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top of his logs. 23 Aside from the romanticism, nothing could be
further from the truth. Liberals are no more opposed to group
activities than they are opposed to playing baseball. Liberals
recognize that people will associate with others of similar interests
and beliefs in every form of organization from bird watching
groups to churches. Liberals acknowledge that many individual
goals, from sports to building a house, are best achieved through
group activity.
In fact, there is much about liberal philosophy that necessitates
associations. In the realm of economics, for example, the notion of
specialized labour, first introduced by Adam Smith, means that
individuals who previously produced a product from start to finish
can form an organization, a business, specialize in one aspect of the
production process and produce the product more efficiently. In
Smith's pin manufacturing example, the organization of pin-makers
into a factory means, "Each person ... might be considered as
making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they had
all wrought separately and independently... they would certainly
not each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a
day." 24 And, in the realm of politics, liberalism was born out of an
acute awareness of the coercive powers of the state. Liberals
recognized that the state's best tactic in putting down protests and
revolts is to prevent its citizens from presenting a united front. As
such, freedom of association has always been one of the
fundamental tenets of a liberal constitution.
What, then, does the liberal mean by individualism?
Historically, liberalism came about as a reaction against class
privilege. Locke's First Treatise of Government was directed towards
Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, which argued for the divine right of
kings. The Second Treatise on Government was directed at the
consensual argument for absolute monarchy presented, for
example, in Hobbes' Leviathan. Locke's state of nature was one of
"equality, all the power and jurisdiction was reciprocal, no one
having more than another; there being nothing more evident than
that creatures of the same species and rank. .. should also be equal

23
24

See Ken Kesey, Sometimes a Great Nation, (New York: Penguin, 1964).
Adam Smith, Wealth ofNations, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1986) at 110.
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one amongst another without subordination or subjection."25 In
contrast, in Europe at the time, an individual's rights and privileges
were determined at birth. Nearly a hundred years later, another
progenitor of liberalism, Rousseau, wrote, "Man is born free, yet
everywhere he is in chains. Many a one believes himself the master
of others, and yet he is a greater slave than they." 26
The notion that some are naturally more able to govern than
others was to be challenged by the liberal argument for individual
equality. These arguments were based on man's natural ability to
reason. Rationality was the one trait perceived to be common to all
men (and later, women). What this individualism meant was that
because no group within society possesses more of this reasoning
capacity than another, no special group can be singled out as the
natural rulers. The legal structure was to change so that the law
applied to all equally, with rights granted to everyone and not the
few.
It is this formulation of individualism that leads to the mistaken
belief that liberals are opposed to groups. A modern example would
be liberal opposition to affirmative action programmes. Arguments
about the merits of affirmative action aside, liberals oppose these
measures because they bring about a hierarchical structure within
society, setting up one group of citizens for favoured treatment.
This is exactly the situation liberals argued against in pre-industrial
Europe. What liberals do say about groups is that no one particular
group should receive special privilege.
So, liberals would be opposed to women as a group receiving
any preferential status, but would they necessarily be opposed to
women's organizations? For example, if a group of women formed
an organization to lobby various hospitals, businesses and
universities to spend more money in research on breast cancer, there
would be nothing unacceptable about this to liberals. Liberals would
acknowledge that if one woman tried to influence these institutions,
she might have little effect, while a group of women who have
pooled resources and talents might have a considerable effect.
The line would be drawn if the women's group went to the
government and argued that they needed to be exempt from laws

25

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett, ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1960) ..
26 The Social Contract, supra note 11 at 7.
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against blackmail so that they may be better able to influence these
institutions. The women's groups may organize as many women as
possible, hold all the peaceful protests they can, make as many
public speeches as possible, and even publicly announce that they
will boycott a company's products unless they spend more money
on breast cancer research; but, what they cannot do is have the laws
apply unequally to them.
A group then, is empowered with all the rights and privileges of
an individual, but nothing more. An individual is allowed to
protest, make speeches and purchase whatever products she wishes
for whatever reasons. However, an individual is not permitted to
blackmail anyone to further her aims. All this is not to say that a
group may not have more power or effect than an individual. An
individual could write to a company's president saying she will
boycott their products until they do more breast cancer research
and this would have no effect. If, however, the same company
president received a petition with the signatures of thousands of
women all promising to boycott the company's products, she might
reconsider her R & D budget. One person (outside of the famous)
can generate little publicity, while an association can not only
generate more interest on the part of the media, but can pool its
resources in order to afford a potent advertising campaign.
If the organization did all this, and aimed its campaign at one
major firm, it might cripple the company, even put it out of
business. Yet, the liberal would have no grounds to rebuke the
women's organization. As long as none of the group's activities was
libelous or coercive, then the group was simply exercising its rights
as individuals collectively. If the criteria for legislating against an
organization, or its methods, are that the group is more effective
than the individual, then liberals may just as well reprove baseball.
In Hobbes' discussion of equality, he wrote that "the weakest
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others." 27 In confederacy with
others, Hobbes tells us, individuals in the state of nature can
transgress against a stronger foe. Hobbes' negative formulation
leaves open the possibility of individuals acting in confederacy to
protect themselves against a more powerful foe. Individuals may
attempt to defend themselves, or enforce their rights against

27

Leviathan, supra note 4 at 98.
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transgressors, but this will only be possible with a weaker adversary
or an unusually co-operative transgressor. As Nozick points out in
his discussion of the state of nature, the solution to this dilemma is
that:
Others may join with him in his defense, at his call. They
may join with him to repulse an attacker or to go off
after an aggressor .... Groups of individuals may form
mutual-protection associations: all will answer the call of
any member for defense or for the enforcement of his
rights. In union there is strength. 28

The underlying recognition here is that there are power differentials
in any society, even one that espouses liberal equality, and that
sometimes associations are needed to correct injustices where the
stronger take advantage of the less powerful.
There is very little discussion within the liberal tradition about
power. Still, liberals are apt to support an association of individuals
in their struggle against a superior force who has committed an
injustice against them. Indeed, this is precisely the situation that
gave birth to liberalism: the burgeoning petit bourgeois' struggle
against the entrenched aristocracy. Liberals were to take up the
cause of various disenfranchised groups as the history of the
suffrage movement in Britain demonstrates. With the support of
the Whig Party, the inheritors of the liberal tradition of the
Revolution of 1688, the bourgeois won the vote with the passage of
the Reform Bill of 1832. The Six Points of the People's Charter was
introduced in Parliament in 1848, challenging bourgeois suffrage
by demanding that workers also be given the vote. This Chartist
movement did not achieve success until Disraeli sponsored the
Reform Bill of 1867 giving the vote to industrial workers. And, in
1884, Gladstone, the preeminent liberal advocate of his day,
sponsored his own Reform Bill enfranchising agricultural workers,
virtually completing manhood suffrage. The final step in the
suffrage movement came with the Reform Bill of 1918 (amended
in 1928) which extended suffrage to women. In each of these
reforms, groups organized themselves, lobbied and fought for
suffrage with the succour of liberals. In short, as long as an
association is attempting to overcome an inequality, liberals will

28

Anarchy, State and Utopia, supra note 3 at 12.
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support it. However, if an association is seeking to disrupt a present
equality, like the minorities' and women's groups which urge
affirmative action programmes, liberals will disavow the association.
The difference between the suffrage issue and affirmative action
proposals is that to have a group excluded from voting was to have
the rules applied unequally while affirmative action programmes
seek to have the rules applied unequally to different sexes and races.
Liberals agree that certain groups were treated unequally in the past,
but through reform the laws were amended to include the
disenfranchised groups and any further measures to adjust the
balance, such as affirmative action, cannot be supported. While
welfare liberals are open to a less formalistic definition of equality,
classical liberals believe that a legal equality is all that can be
defended.

4. The Role of Government
Another example of liberals endorsing actions that overcome an
inequality is their support for anti-trust laws. If Company A is
abusing its monopoly position in the market for a particular good
by charging an above-market price for its product, the government
is sanctioned to intervene. Not only is the state to ensure that all
enjoy equal liberty, but it is charged with the responsibility of
overseeing the smooth operation of the free market.
Of course, there is a fine line between intruding on the free
market and ensuring its smooth running. Most liberals are of the
opinion that the state already intervenes far too often in the free
market and they would be reluctent to call for any further
intervention. Despite this, liberals generally recognize as legitimate
several functions the government can and should perform in a
laissez-faire economy. For example, the state should prevent
industrial espionage and sabotage. If a company is stealing secrets
from its competitors or using coercive tactics, the government is the
appropriate agency to rectify this. Also, the state, in its role as the
only legitimate bearer of coercive power, should enforce all legally
binding contracts. The state may also oversee the registry and
protection of patents and copyrights. Hayek, for example, has
argued that current patent law, which gives the patentor exclusive
rights to a patented product for a specified time, should be
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changed so that anyone may use the knowledge of a patent but
must pay the patentor a royalty. 29 And finally, as mentioned, the
government should attempt to correct any obvious abuses of the
free market by a company that has gained a monopolistic position.
This last example is perhaps the most contentious. Some more
naive liberals are convinced that a laissez faire economy will never
lead to monopoly situations and therefore there would never be a
need for government interference. Other, more realistic liberal
economists recognize the possibility of monopolies and the
government's role in preserving the free market. However, even
these liberals put strict limitations on what the state can do. Firstly,
the interference must be as non-intrusive as possible. If, for
example, Company A gained its dominant position because of
advances in productive technology, the government may lift the
patent on the technology (and have competitors pay Company A a
royalty, as Hayek suggests) rather than legislating price control
measures. And the government should only intervene if there is no
free market solution to the situation. If, for example, Company A
dominates because of a tariff on its foreign competitors' products,
the government should lift the tariff.
Liberals also claim that there are several areas of the economy in
which the government should not be involved. For example,
minimum wage legislation has been contested by many liberals as
an encroachment upon the market order that skews the price of
labour and results in unemployment.3° Other examples include
legislation regulating maximum work hours, safety conditions,
holidays and vacations, overtime, hours of operation, health
insurance and affirmative action hiring. Businesses and workers,
argue liberals, should be free to negotiate these things for
themselves. In the ideal liberal economy, companies would compete
for workers and would have to offer competitive wages, work hours,
safety conditions, etc., in order to attract the most productive
workers. At the same time, they would have to try to keep these
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F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1988) at 36-37.
30 There are many liberal arguments against minimum wage legislation. The
text I will be using extensively is Henry Hazlitt, Economics in One Lesson, (New
York: Arlington House, 1979).
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costs as low as possible in order for their own product to be
competitively priced.
The moral imperative of liberalism compels individuals to
accomplish the goals they set out for themselves with a minimum
of assistance from the state and as little coerced help as possible.
This dictate provides liberals with the basis for their negative
formulation of liberty. However, liberals do not advocate that
individuals accomplish all tasks alone without ever participating in
group activities. It is recognized that associations are an effective
means of attaining many goals. The role of the government is to
ensure liberty and equality for individuals. Some liberals would also
concede that part of that role involves the state in the free market.
The concept of the free market is an inextricable aspect of
liberalism, and an explanation of exactly how the state is to act in
the free market is the next step in understanding liberalism.

III. LIBERAL THEORY IN PRACTICE: FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION

The most natural right of man, next to the right of acting
for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those
of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with
them. The right of association therefore appears to me
almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the
foundations of society.
Alexis de Tocqueville31
1. Introduction

A full legal argument for deriving constitutional protection for the
right to strike from the freedom of association would be too
cumbersome in the context of this work. The aim in this section is
much more modest. I would like to provide the basis for a liberal
critique of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in this

3! Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1945) vol. 1, p. 196.
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matter.3 2 The union representatives who presented their cases before
the various provincial courts and eventually the Supreme Court
argued variously that the right to strike was essential to the purposes
of unions, that unions are a fundamental characteristic of our
culture, that the governments involved acted arbitrarily in singling
out unions and that for all these reasons the right to strike should be
constitutionally protected under the freedom of association. The
important question for liberals, however, is to what extent the
government should be allowed to interfere with the freedom of
association. As far as possible, I would like to concentrate on the
freedom of association and leave the right to strike to the next
section.
2. American Jurisprudence

Before turning to the Canadian court decisions, it is interesting to
study the American jurisprudence on the topic of freedom of
association and the right to strike. As Dickson C.J.C. noted,33 there
are two key differences between the American freedom of
association and the Canadian version: first, the American freedom
of association is a derivative of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech and the freedom to petition. 34 The first thing to note here is
a precedent for deriving one right from another. It is freedom of
association that is derived from other freedoms and not the right to
strike from freedom of association. However, the point remains
that to the American judiciary, it is not foreign to derive a
secondary right from a primary one in order to make the primary
right meaningful. The second difference is that there is no
equivalent in the American Constitution to s. 1 of the Charter. That
is to say, there is no opening for an American court to affirm a right
to strike and then recognize a reasonable limit on this right in
accordance with the requirements of a free and democratic society.
3 2 See Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Labour Relations Act
and Police Officers Collective Bargaining Act (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161; Public
Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 249; Government
of Saskatchewan et al. v. Retail Wholesale & Department Store Union, Locals 544,
496, 635 & 955 et al. (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 277.
33 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, ibid. at 181-183.
34 A few cases of interest here are Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Baird v.
State Bar ofArizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); NA.A. C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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How would one expect the American judicial system to
respond to cases involving the abrogation of union strikes? It would
be fair to say that the expectation would be very low as far as the
unions are concerned. Given that there is no direct reference to the
freedom of association in the American constitution but that it is a
derivative of another fundamental freedom it would seem unlikely
that the courts would be willing to derive a further right from this
right. A derivative from a derivative is not the most solid ground to
build a case on. Also, given that there is no constitutional means for
the court to balance this freedom, any framing of such a right
would be watery and minimal at best.
Given the tremendous odds against American unions achieving
a right to strike relative to their Canadian counterparts it comes as
somewhat of a surprise to find that there have been several
favourable decisions for unions in protecting the means to obtain
their ends within American jurisprudence. As expected, the
protection of union activities is limited. For example, the right to
strike is limited to the private sector. Further, the United States
Supreme Court writes, "The right to strike, because of its more
serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to
regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for
the lawful purposes of collective bargaining." 35 These restrictions on
the right to strike in American jurisprudence are likely a result of
having no recourse to limitations on fundamental freedoms for
reasonable purposes such as is afforded by s. 1 of the Charter. The
important points to be ascertained from the American example are
that there is a greater scope given to the idea that fundamental
freedoms are not to be interpreted narrowly and that there is a
willingness to derive secondary rights in order to give meaning to
the primary, stated rights. The decisions of the American courts,
given all the factors which differentiate our systems, can be
illuminating when considering the cases that have arisen in Canada.
3. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Charter
If the right to strike is suppressed, or seriously limited,
the trade union movement becomes nothing more than
one institution among many in the service of capitalism: a

35

UA. WA. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) at 259.
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convenient organization for disciplining the workers,
occupying their leisure time, and ensuring their
profitability for business.36

If Trudeau still had this youthful idealism when he formulated the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, perhaps trade unions would not
now be in such a constitutional bind. Of course, the Charter does
not contain an explicit recognition of the right to strike, but what
the Charter does guarantee as a fundamental freedom is association
in s. 2(d). This left the way open for a number of battles in the
provincial courts involving unions and what they perceived as the
abrogation of their freedom of association. These separate cases
reached the Supreme Court of Canada in April 1987 when the
Court gave its concurrent decision on three cases involving union
rights. The Public Service Alliance of Canada (PsAc), the union
representing almost all federal employees, brought an action against
the federal government as a result of the Public Sector Compensation
Restraint Act 37 which the Trudeau government instituted in order
to deal with the high rates of inflation experienced in the early
eighties. The inflation rate reached 12.9% in June and July of 1981.
Essentially the Act limited wage increases in the federal public
sector to six percent in the first year and five percent in the second
year. PSAC challenged the legislation first in the Federal Court,
Trial Division with Reed J. in 1984 and then in the Supreme Court
of Canada with Dickson, C.J.C., Beetz, Mcintyre, Wilson, Le Dain
and La Forest JJ. in 1987. This same panel heard an Alberta
reference on its own Public Service Employee Relations Act which
followed the federal initiative on inflation. 38 The final case dealt
with the Saskatchewan Legislature's Dairy Workers (Maintenance of
Operation) Act, 1983-84, which it invoked in response to the threat
of a strike by dairy workers and a lockout by dairies.39 Among
other things, the Act prohibited strikes and lockouts for a certain
period of time.
Each case framed the question slightly differently, but
essentially what the Supreme Court was asked to decide was

36 Pierre E. Trudeau, The Asbestos Strike, trans. James Boake (Toronto: James
Lewis and Samuel, 1974) at 336.
37 R.S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 122.
38 R.S.A. 1980, c. P-133.
39 S.S. 1983-84, c. D-1.1.
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whether or not the right to strike and to bargain collectively is
contained within s. 2(d) of the Charter. In some instances this is
given and leads a s. 1 analysis. The appellants also claimed that the
Restraint Act violated the "equality before the law" provision, s.
1(b), of the Canadian Bill ofRights.
One of the arguments put forward by the justices is that if the
right to strike was derived from the freedom of association it would
necessarily sanction all other objectives of all other groups. The
freedom of association, they argued, only guarantees the freedom
to join together in an organization and does not sanction the objects
of that organization. Under this interpretation of the freedom of
association, a bird watching group can hold meetings, pay dues and
discuss its favourite birds. But as soon as the group goes out to
watch some birds, the government can step in and prohibit that
action, leaving no recourse to the Charter. Le Dain J. expresses this
concern when he wrote:
It is essential to keep in mind that this concept must be
applied to a wide range of associations or organizations of
a political, religious, social or economic nature, with a
wide variety of objects, as well as activities by which the
objects may be pursued. It is in this larger perspective,
and not simply with regard to the perceived requirements
of a trade union ... that one must consider the implications
of extending a constitutional guarantee, under the
concept of freedom of association, to the right to engage
in particular activity on the ground that the activity is
essential to give an association meaningful existence. 40

Le Dain J. seems worried that if the Court agrees that the right to
strike is vital to making union association meaningful, other
organizations would argue that the objects of their organization
must receive constitutional protection because otherwise their
associations would be meaningless. The bird watchers group, for
example, when faced with the Bird Watchers Restraint Act, could
take the government to court and demand that they be allowed to
bird watch because otherwise their association is meaningless.
The first reaction of any liberal to this argument would be to
question the role of the government in preventing its citizens from
participating in any activity regardless of whether the activity is

40

Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra note 32 at 239.
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done by groups or individuals. So long as the group is not
infringing or interfering with the liberty of other citizens, the
activities of that association should not be banned by the
government. Unless the bird watchers are breaking into my house
to observe my pet parakeet, the government cannot be allowed to
prohibit their activity and is obliged to allow them the greatest
possible scope of freedom in the pursuit of this end.
A more germane example would be an association formed to
criticize government policy in a specified field, trade relations for
example. The objective of this organization would be to generate as
much public opposition to the government's policy as possible.
Under the Supreme Court's restrictions on the freedom of
association, the lobby group would be allowed to form but the state
is permitted to restrict their lobbying efforts despite the fact that
this is the sole objective of the association and without such powers
it is useless. 41
Still, critics will argue that associations should not be given
special protection just because they are associations. Peter Gall
presented the argument when he wrote:
One of our levels of government may decide to ban the
ownership of guns. This would not infringe any
individual right under the Charter. But if some
individuals have combined to form a gun club, does the
Charter's protection of freedom of association mean that
the principal activity of the gun club, namely the
ownership and use of guns, is constitutionally protected?
One is quickly forced to the conclusion that it does not.
The Charter does not protect the right to bear arms,
regardless of whether the activity is carried out by an
individual or by an association. The mere fact that it is
the principal activity of the gun club does not give it a
constitutional status. 42

41

Of course, bird watching and government lobbying do not involve any third
parties. Third parties are often drawn into labour disputes unwillingly. For
example, when firefighters go on strike against the city, home owners are caught in
the middle. These examples will be discussed at length in the next section.
42 Peter A. Gall, "Freedom of Association and Trade Unions: A Double-Edged
Constitutional Sword" in Weiler and Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values ofa Nation:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 247.
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Aside from the merits of gun control, the analogy between banning
guns and banning strikes is difficult to sustain. The key difference
between a government initiative to limit the ownership of guns and
anti-union legislation is that the gun laws are directed towards
individuals while the latter is directed at an association, namely a
particular union. Recall that the liberal asserts that what applies to
the individual must also apply to the association. While the liberals
would have problems with gun control legislation in itself, they
could not allow the group to have a constitutional protection not
afforded the individual. However, what the anti-union legislation
does is single out an association just because it is an association. If
Gall were to draw a more apt analogy it would have to be that the
government permitted gun ownership and use by individuals but
forbade the ownership and use of guns for gun clubs, or even more
appropriately, for a specific gun dub. Alternatively, the government
would have to ban all individuals from ceasing work for the purpose
of negotiating a better contract with their employers. If the law was
logically consistent, it would then apply to unions. However, in
practice this is not what anti-strike legislation does. It not only
singles out associations for special restrictions but it most often
singles out a specific association.
It is not a matter of advocating that a group formed for the
purpose of promoting statism be allowed to murder any and all
anarchists they wish. The proposal is not that in the formation of an
association the group has ultimate protection for whatever unlawful
purposes the group was formed. Rather, the position should be that
if the activity is unlawful for all individuals, it would be unlawful
for associations as well. Galligan J. of the Divisional Court of the
Ontario High Court ofJustice made this point when he wrote, "But
I think that freedom of association if it is to be meaningful must
include freedom to engage in conduct which is reasonably
consonant with the lawful objects of an association. And I think a
lawful object is any object which is not prohibited by law." 43 The
government may not prohibit bird-watching groups from bird
watching because bird watching is not prohibited by law. The
government may prohibit the slaughter of anarchists by socialist

43 Re Service Employees International Union, Local 204 and Broadway Manor
Nursing Home (1983), 4 D.L.R. (4th) 231 at 248. (Ont Div. Ct.); rev'd in part
(1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 220 (Ont. C.A) [hereinafter Broadway Manor].
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groups because murder is against the law. Regardless of how large
or organized an association the socialists form, they can never be
given the right to murder.
While the Supreme Court dwells on what actions may be
sanctioned in giving the freedom of association a broad
interpretation, for the liberal, there is a more realistic concern in
having a court that gives strict, semantic interpretations to rights
and freedoms. If these rights and freedoms are interpreted
narrowly, the government is given greater leeway in what actions it
may and may not permit. The concern should rather be: What
groups' actions may the state legislate against under such a
meaningless Charter? The Supreme Court seems overly concerned
with possible scenarios where the government would be overly
restricted, and has neglected to consider the more plausible
scenarios where individual liberty could be curbed because of a
constricted interpretation of the freedoms guaranteed in the
Charter.
Mcintyre J.'s decisions on the three simultaneous cases should
be given particular attention as he was the dominant voice for the
majority decision. It would be a little misleading to say he wrote
the majority decision. In fact, Mcintyre J. wrote separate decisions
to which Le Dain J. assented for the most part. But he wrote his
own short decisions in which Beetz J. concurred. Dickson C.J.C.
and Wilson J. were the two dissenters on the Court and they both
wrote their own opinions.
Mcintyre J. set out six possible interpretations of freedom of
association: The first asserts that the freedom of association is "no
more than freedom to enter into consensual agreements to promote
the common interest objects of the associating group" 44 but does
not protect any of the objects of those associations. The second
protects those objects of associations that are already protected in
the constitution. For example, a religious group's associative
activities would receive judicial protection because freedom of
worship is in the Constitution, but bird watching would receive no
protection. Mcintyre J. 's preferred interpretation is the third on his
list which provides that "an individual is entitled to do in concert
what he is entitled to do alone and, conversely, that individuals and
44 Per Sir Hugh Wooding C.J. in Collymore et al v. A.G. of Trinidad and
Tobago, [1969] 2 All E.R. at 547.
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organizations have no right to do in concert what is unlawful when
done individually. "45 This is the definition offered here for the
liberal interpretation of the freedom of association, although we
shall see how Mcintyre J. skews it. The fourth interpretation
protects the objects of association when those objects are
fundamental to our culture. This view was offered by Kerans ].A.
when he wrote:
In my view the freedom [of association] includes the
freedom to associate with others in the exercise of
Charter-protected rights and also those other rights
which-in Canada-are thought so fundamental as not
to need formal expression: to marry, for example, or to
establish a home and family, pursue an education or gain
a livelihood. 46

The fifth interpretation would afford constitutional protection for
all those lawful objects of associations that are essential to their
purposes. Mcintyre J. attributes this position to Smith J. of the
Ontario Divisional Court when Smith J. wrote, "The freedom of
association carries with it the freedom to meet to pursue the lawful
objects and activities essential to the association's purposes." 4 7
Finally, the sixth position is the most permissive in that it protects
any and all associational activities subject only to s. 1 of the
Charter.
Mcintyre ]. does not advocate either of the polar extremes. The
most restrictive definition is rejected as overly narrow and having
too little force and effect. The last three definitions, the more
permissive ones, are rejected because, as he writes, "People, by
merely combining together, cannot create an entity which has
greater constitutional rights and freedoms than they, as individuals,
possess. " 48 Mcintyre ]. echoes here the point made earlier that
groups cannot receive any elevated status at law. On this liberal
point, it is agreed that the freedom of association is, in fact, an
individual right and not a group right. As T.I. Emerson wrote,
"Association is an extension of individual freedom. It is a method

45

Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra note 32 at 222.
Black v. Law Society ofAlberta (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 527 at 542-43 (Alta.
CA).
47 Broadway Manor, supra note 43 at 302.
48 Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, supra note 32 at 220.
46
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of making more effective, of giving greater depth and scope to the
individual's needs, aspirations and liberties." 4 9
It may seem odd to say that the freedom of association is an
individual right. After all, does it not, by its very name, apply to
groups and not individuals? The distinction being made here is
between "extending individual freedom" or "enlarging personal
freedom, "5° and being granted a right due solely to one's
membership in an association. Mcintyre J. cites s. 93 of the
Constitution Act 1867 and s. 25 of the Charter as the only two
examples of "group" rights in the Canadian constitution.51 Taking
s. 25 as an example, this right is given specifically and explicitly
because of group interests, that is to say, the collective nature of
aboriginal rights. The purpose of the section is precisely to give the
collectivity precedence over the individual. In a thoroughly liberal
society, of course, this would never be the case. The point here,
however, is simply that just because the freedom of association
applies to groups in a general way does not imply that it means to
set up all associations for this sort of privilege. And this is what is
meant when it is said that the freedom of association is an
individual right.
Of course, every association is composed of individuals. The
raison d'etre of any association is that it gives a greater security of
purpose than individual action. That is, it enhances the chances of
achieving one's individual goals. This is exactly the case of the trade
union. The individual's chances of achieving greater job security,
pay, benefits, safer work conditions, etc., are enhanced through an
association with fellow employees. First and foremost the trade
union is concerned with advancing the conditions of the individuals
within the group.

49

T. I. Emerson, "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression," (1986)
74 Yale L. J. 1 at 4.
50 See: Clyde Summers, "Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in
Sweden and the United States" (1964) 112 U. Penn. L.R. at 647, where he writes,
"Freedom of association is an individual right vested in the individual to enable him
to enlarge his personal freedom."
5l Although there are more. Dickson C.J.C. also sites s. 133 of the Constitution
Act 1867 along with ss. 16-24, 27 and 29 of the Charter which, "implicitly embody
an awareness of the importance of various collectives," Re Public Service Employee
Relations Act, supra note 32 at 196.
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Mcintyre J.'s first premise is that the freedom of association is
an individual right; his second, that the group cannot have a right
the individual does not have. The liberal cannot dispute these
premises. His conclusion that freedom of association does not entail
the right to strike requires a third premise: the individual does not
have the right to strike. Mcintyre J. supplies this premise when he
quotes Dickson C.J.C. in the same case, "There is no individual
equivalent to a strike. The refusal to work by one individual does
not parallel a collective refusal to work. "5 2 The syllogism will only
work if this major premise is true. The argument hinges on whether
or not the individual has the right to strike. In opting for the third
of his own definitions of the freedom of association, he is
committed to defending any group rights that the members of that
group enjoy individually.
Mcintyre J. believes individuals cannot lawfully refuse to work
for two reasons:
First, it is not correct to say that it is lawful for an
individual employee to cease work during the currency of
his contract of employment... The second reason is
simply that there is no analogy whatever between the
cessation of work by a single employee and a strike
conducted in a accordance with modern labour
legislation ... An employee who ceases work does not
contemplate a return to work, while employees on strike
always contemplate a return to work. 53

The first objection can easily be dealt with by saying that no one is
advocating that employees be given the right to strike at any point
during their contract of employment. Normally, a union will only
strike at the end of its contract and then only as a last resort after
protracted negotiations have failed. As mentioned earlier, there is
the long-term contract between employer and employees with
specific intervals set up for the renegotiation of the particulars. If a
union ceased work outside of these renegotiation intervals, then
there is no difficulty in allowing the government to step in and
enforce the contractual obligation the union has broken.
Mcintyre J.'s second point is more complex. It is not clear in
what sense there is "no analogy" between an individual ceasing work
52 Ibid.
53

at 198.
Ibid. at 229-30.
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and a union going on strike. He clarifies by saying that the
individual never contemplates a return to work while the union
does. Yet, this is far from the case. There are many examples and
possible scenarios where an individual may cease work with the full
intention of returning. The star athlete may cease playing at the end
of his interim contract and begin to negotiate a new salary. Just as
the union may argue that an increase in its workers' productivity has
increased its employers profits, the athlete may argue that his
enhanced skills have improved the team's winning record (and thus
the team's profitability) and he will demand a higher salary.
Another example is when Harrison Ford signs with Paramount
Studios for three movies. After the first movie is a blockbuster,
Ford will renegotiate his salary for the second picture. He is not
ceasing work in the middle of a movie's production so he is not
refusing to work during the currency of his contract. However, he is
refusing to work until his benefits are renegotiated-in other words,
he is striking.
A hypothetical example may be if Company A decided to hire
a famous television star as its spokesperson for a number of its
products but is wary and wants to gauge the public's reaction to her
so they settle on a wage package for the first product endorsement
and agree to renegotiate for the next. The spokesperson may make
very high salary demands if the first product sells very well.5 4
All these examples, it may be argued, apply to famous or
exceptional people and have nothing to do with the everyday world
of blue-collar workers. Perhaps this is what Mcintyre J. had in
mind, that there is no analogy of individual strikes amongst blue
collar workers. Indeed, if the factory worker went to her employer
and said, "I want a 10% pay increase and I refuse to work until I
get it,'' the employer would be less than receptive. If this is what
Mcintyre J. meant then he is arguing that there is no analogy
because the individual is far less effective than the association. If this
is the case, recall our example of the consumers' group lobbying the
pharmaceutical company for additional funding into breast cancer

54 If one puts one's mind to it, there are innumerable examples of individual
strikes: writers who have signed with a publishing house for a three book contract
and the professor who signs a two year contract at the end of which she is up for
tenure and during the course of which she discovers a cure for cancer may want
more than a larger office from her contract. The examples go on and on.
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research. The point of that scenario was that associations cannot be
legislated against simply because they are more effective. To argue
this would render pointless the whole purpose of associations as the
only reason one joins an association is because it is a more effective
way of achieving one's ends.
When the government singles out a union for back-to-work
legislation, the effect is to isolate the individuals and deny them the
effectiveness that is secured through the association. It is odd that
little is said when the government orders a group of workers back to
work but if the government were to order a single person to resume
work, an athlete or spokesperson, it would be an outrage. While no
association should receive constitutional protection simply because
it is an association, if the freedom of association means anything,
surely it means that no association can be singled out merely
because it is an association.

IV. LIBERAL THEORY IN PRACTICE: THE
FREEDOM TO STRIKE
"Ever been in a strike?" Willie asked.
"No."

"Well, I been a-thinkin' a lot. Why don' them depities
get in here an' raise hell like ever' place else? Think that
little guy in the office is a-stoppin' em? No, sir."
"Well, what is it?" Jule asked.
''I'll tell ya. It's cause we're all a-working together.
Depity can't pick on one fella in this camp. He's pickin'
on the whole darn camp. An' he don't dare. All we got to
do is give a yell an' they's two hundred men out. Fella
organizin' for the union was a-talkin' out on the road. He
says we could do that any place. J us' stick together. They
ain't rasin' hell with no two hundred men. They're
pickin' on one man."

John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath
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1. Freedom or Right?

The simplest way to differentiate these two concepts of rights and
freedoms, which are often taken as synonymous, is to say that a
right is a right to something while a freedom is a freedom from
something, usually government interference. The question that is
raised here is whether striking is a freedom or a right.55 The
distinction is important because the liberal will only support the
negative conception of non-interference but not the positive right to
formulation.5 6
What are the union members being given when they exercise
their right to strike? Some would answer that they are being given
higher wages, better benefits or whatever else is sought by striking.
If this is the case, then it is untrue that workers have a right to any
of these things. The liberal does not allow that anyone has a right to
a particular wage for a specific job. Those philosophers who have
protested the supply and demand determination of prices and
wages have created various schemes for an objective calculation of
wages and prices. Marx, for example, believed that each person
should be given a wage according to their need.
Liberals deny these claims and argue that the only price or wage
is what the market will bear. But this is not what unions are
asserting when they postulate a right to strike. There is no set wage
or benefits package that is morally justifiable outside the turbulent
give and take of the free market. In contrast to socialists, liberals do
not believe that one end result is any more just than another. As
long as the rules of the game are just, the results will be just. This is
how liberals justify the often severe inequality present in a liberal
society and attack socialists for wanting to change the outcome.
The analogy that is often used focuses upon the rules of a game. It
would make little sense to criticize the score of a hockey game even
if the home team is defeated soundly. As long as all the rules apply
equally to both teams, the final score is just. Only if one team were
allowed to be offside and the other not would there be cause to

55 Interestingly, Galligan J. makes this distinction in Broadway Manor, supra
note 43 at 246-248, and decides that, to be precise, it must be referred to as the
freedom to strike, although he enters the discussion for different reasons than I do
here.
56 See Part I, above, for a discussion of this issue.
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question the outcome of the game. It does not matter that one
team is better and stronger than the other team.
Such is the case with labour negotiations. Liberals cannot
complain that a union receives too much in labour negotiations
simply because it has the bargaining power to exact a generous
contract. Likewise, socialists cannot complain if the union failed to
have its demands met. What the unions are really seeking is the
right to enter into the labour negotiation process without the fear of
the state's coercive powers being used against them. It is a freedom
they seek, the same freedom liberals seek for all individuals-the
freedom from government interference. The right to strike is only a
right in the sense that unions have the right to enter into labour
negotiations free from government intervention. In the same sense,
freedom of religion is a right to worship free of state involvement.
So the right to strike is really the freedom to strike. The
argument has been made that if the government is kept out of the
labour field by providing unions with a constitutionally protected
freedom to strike, the balance of power would be unfairly changed
in favour of the unions. Mcintyre]. makes the point when he writes:
To intervene in that dynamic [i.e. that of labour
negotiations] ... by implying constitutional protection for
a right to strike would, in my view, give to one of the
contending forces an economic weapon removed from
and made immune, subject to s. l, to legislative control
which could go far towards freezing the development of
labour relations and curtailing the process of evolution
necessary to meet the changing circumstances of a
modern society in a modern world.57

Mcintyre J. believes that in dismissing the case he is leaving the
situation as it was before with the power structure more or less
equal. After all, he is not taking the freedom to strike away from
unions but merely allowing the legislatures to regulate this freedom
as they see fit. Unions can still legally strike in the same manner as
they always could.
The fact that some unions did strike, and strike successfully,
does not mean that unions had the legal freedom to strike. Even
after this decision, some unions will still strike. The conclusion that

57

Re Public Service Employee Relations Act supra note 32 at 241.
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the freedom to strike is not compromised because the government
allows some strikes to go on is a non sequitur. A totalitarian regime
may allow certain religions to practice but ban all others. Could this
regime be said to have freedom of religion? What the Supreme
Court did in failing to recognize a constitutional freedom to strike
was to allow the government to step into any labour dispute and
order the union back to work, which, in effect, enervates the
freedom to strike.
Mcintyre J. believes that in denying unions the freedom to
strike he was remaining impartial in the field of labour relations. In
fact, he believes that if unions were granted this freedom, he would
be "freezing" the "process of evolution" by giving unions an unfair
advantage. In its present form, the labour negotiation process is
generally to the advantage of the employer. Obviously, some
unions have more bargaining power than others. However, this
power rarely exceeds that of their employer. For many reasons,
unions are reluctant to launch a strike and once they do strike, there
are pressures on a union to settle quickly. First, as Smith pointed
out, the effects of a labour dispute are more immediate to the
workers than to management:
A landowner, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or

merchant, though they did not employ a single
workman, could live a year or two upon the stocks which
they have already acquired. Many workmen could not
subsist a week, a few could subsist a month, and scarce
any a year without employment. In the long-run the
workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to
him; but the necessity is not so immediate. [my

emphasis]. 58
Even farther removed are the stockholders of those companies that
are publicly traded. Secondly, many companies will have a reserve
of their product on hand, especially if they have anticipated labour
trouble, which will see them through the initial strike period.
Workers, on the other hand, may have limited savings but even if
they do, they will reluctantly dip into their life savings or their
child's college fund, certainly more reluctantly than the company
will use up its surplus stock. Also, depending on the provincial

58

The Wealth ofNations, supra note 24 at 169.
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legislation and the union contract, it may be possible for the
company to bring in replacement workers while the strikers must
report for picket duty each day. Where replacement workers cannot
be used, some companies can get by for a short time by using
management to run the factory. Often, union workers are restricted
from finding a temporary job during the strike and even when this
is permissible, the hopes of finding an interim position are limited.
A strike may involve thousands of workers, each of them feeling the
effects of the work stoppage differently. This is why it is very
difficult, even in a small union, to maintain cohesion, while the
employer can more easily offer a united front.
It is difficult to maintain that the Supreme Court's decision is
neutral. The government only rarely intervenes on behalf of the
unions. None of Canada's major political parties have a great track
record on protecting unions.
2. Why Do Governments Intervene?
Liberals do not subscribe to the anti-capitalist sentiment that the
state is really another interest in the service of capitalism. There is
evidence that corporations do exert a greater influence over
governments than many liberal democrats assume. However, there
are other reasons, less controversial to liberals, why government
intervenes on behalf of business in labour disputes.
Governments are also under pressure from their constituents to
act on behalf of their greater good. To take a hypothetical example,
Company A has been deadlocked in a labour dispute for months.
The company takes the position that it simply cannot afford to
meet the demands of the workers and it cannot get the recalcitrant
union to understand this. If the strike continues, the company will
be forced to take drastic actions. Plants will be dosed, jobs will be
lost, or at the very least, prices will have to be raised. An appeal is
then made to the government, either by the company or the public
(or the company on behalf of the public) to help settle the dispute.
When they are not constitutionally restrained from doing so, it is
very difficult for the state not to step in and force the union back to
work. The case becomes even more compelling when the work
disruption affects the direct supply of a product to the public, such
as milk in the case of the dairy workers or mail in a Canadian
Union of Postal Workers' (cuPw) strike.
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It is this democratic pressure that is responsible for more state
interference in labour disputes than, as the socialists would have it, a
manipulative capitalist class controlling government. The function
of a liberal constitution is to restrain the majority, through their
elected officials, from compromising individual freedom. This role
of liberalism as a restraint on democracy is played out on many
levels. Morally, the democratic majority may be appalled by the
position someone takes in a speech but the liberal freedom of
speech is in place to prevent the majority from legislating against
this person. Economically, the majority may wish the minority of
wealthy individuals to shoulder an unfair percentage of the tax
burden. Liberalism would preclude the majority from exacting this.
From the liberal perspective, workers have no moral
responsibility to provide a product or service to the public. In a
proper liberal constitution, the public would be restrained from
forcing them to do so. The moral imperative of liberalism compels
each individual to provide the necessities of life for herself. The
public is no more allowed to force the worker back into the factory
than they are morally permitted to demand a share of her wages.
When a union goes on strike, especially if it is a large or public
union, it often tries to get the public on its side through advertising
campaigns or manipulation of the media. This approach has always
seemed misguided. There is no reason whatsoever for the union to
need the public's support. The union is simply exercising their
liberal freedom to strike and there is no reason to think that the
public would support it in this effort. More often than not, the
successes of a striking union are detrimental to the self-interests of
those individuals outside of the union. Higher wages for union
members may mean that the products of that company go up in
price. Unless the individuals outside of the striking union are
members of a similar union which may be able to use the striking
union's wage increase as leverage in their own negotiations, the
public is either opposed to any wage increases or indifferent. The
only reason to launch a public relations campaign during a strike is
to prevent the public from pressuring the state to step into the
labour dispute.
Because the public often stands to lose in labour disputes,
socialist theory is antipathetic to unions. Despite the fact that
unions have taken socialism as their theory of choice, there is good
reason to question this. For the socialist, the individual's rights are
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subsumed into the greater social, or communal, rights of the public.
Individual rights are only held subject to the greater good of the
community. For example, under a liberal constitution a company
can sell its product for whatever price the free market will support,
but under a communal rights doctrine the company can be forced
to sell its product at a lower price so that the less fortunate may
afford it. The same applies for the freedom to strike. Although
socialists are quick to support unions in their struggle against the
capitalists, whom they see to be the dominant class, in practice they
have had to weigh the benefits of a strike against the effects on the
community. The balance has rarely weighed in favour of the unions.
There is another, more direct reason why a government would
intervene with legislation in a labour dispute. Governments
themselves have a huge labour force, most of whom are unionized.
Even with the drive towards smaller and smaller government, they
still have one of the largest unionized labour forces in the country.
Government itself is often drawn into labour disputes with its own
workers, and in these cases the temptation to use its coercive
legislative powers is even more enticing.

3. Public Sector Unions
The most well-known case regarding the abrogation of collective
bargaining and the freedom to strike of a public sector union is the
one brought against the federal government by PSAC as a result of
Trudeau's Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act, 1982, popularly
known as the "6 & 5" restraint programme.59 As a case study of
how a government deals with its own unions, this example points to
several interesting and enlightening aspects of the relationship.
The express purpose of this legislation was to encourage the
private sector and the provinces to implement their own wage
restraints. As well, the government wished to lower the unions'
expectations when negotiating wage increases. They argued that it
needed to take a leadership role and show restraint itself if it
expected others to tighten the proverbial belt and help fight
inflation. Allan MacEachen, then the Minister of Finance, said,
"The private sector and the provinces could not be expected to
accept income restraint unless the government of Canada showed

59 Supra note 37.
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leadership in the conduct of its own affairs." 60 The claim was that
the act would result in lower wage settlements throughout the
economy and thus help ease inflation.
Thus, the federal government cast itself in the role of economic
leader taking the initiative by tightening its own belt. With the
spotlight focused on the government's leadership role, its role as an
employer was left in the shadows. As an employer, the federal
government had a vested self-interest in controlling its employees.
If the government was acting strictly as an economic leader and had
no interest in subduing its employees, it follows that the
government would have restricted itself to purely monetary matters
simply because any restriction of non-monetary matters would have
no effect on inflation. The government, however, did not restrict
itself in this way. Section 6(1) of the Restraint Act reads as follows:
6(1) Notwithstanding any other act of Parliament except
the Human Rights Act, but subject to section 7, the terms
and conditions of
(a) every compensation plan that is extended under
section 4 or 5, and
(b) every collective agreement or arbitral award that
included such a compensation plan,

shall, subject to this Part, continue in force and without
change for the period for which the compensation plan is
extended [emphasis added].

Dickson C.J.C.'s interpretation of s. 6(1)(b) was that it "precludes
collective bargaining on all issues, including non-compensatory
matters." 61
Clearly, the government had something else in mind besides
controlling inflation. It made no attempt to limit itself to
compensatory matters but, rather, chose to restrict collective
bargaining and striking for any and all matters, regardless of
whether or not they would affect inflation. Behind the facade of the
government acting in the role of economic leader was the role of

60

Hon. Allan MacEachen, House of Commons Debates, June 28, 1982, p.
18878.
61 PSACv. The Queen, supra note 32 at 254 ..
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the government as an employer. 62 Of course, wage increases are not
the only compensatory matter. Maternity leave, employee benefits,
sick leave and vacation time, all affect finances. All of these factors
can affect the financial situation of the government and could have
legitimately been included in wage restraint package. However,
such matters as employee safety, management rights, grievance
procedures, seniority and employee rights, 63 do not affect the fiscal
situation of the employer in question and should not have been
abrogated in any way.
In drafting a blanket piece of legislation that affected all aspects
of the employer-employee relationship, the governments in
question tipped their hands to a surreptitious purpose of the
legislation-to gain the upper hand over employees while ostensibly
attempting to control inflation. If this had not been the purpose,
there would have been clauses stating that nothing in the legislation
affected the status, bargaining or striking potential of the
employees regarding issues not related to pecuniary matters. Such a
clause would have gone far to ease the reaction of the unions and
make the tough medicine more palatable.
The cynical observer may also conclude that the government
was trying to diffuse some of the blame for the inflationary
situation by singling out the unions for the remedy. Consider the
psychological affect of this legislation on the public. With rampant
inflation threatening to ruin the economy, the government
announces its bold plan to deal with the situation: it is going to reel
in the wage increases of its own unions in the hope that other unions
will be similarly disciplined. In the absence of a complex economic
explanation of the causes of inflation, the public is left to draw the
conclusion that if unions are being singled out they must have
caused the inflation. Whether or not this was the purpose of the
government, the affect of the legislation was to deflect some of the
blame away from those government policies that played a part in
creating the inflation. As any student of economics knows, an

62 Nor was this an isolated case. In Ontario's Inflation Restraint Act, 1982, which
followed the federal initiative, s. 13(b) also extended the legislation to noncompensatory matters. I shall not repeat the section here as it is almost identical to
the previous section of the Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act.
63 I take these examples from Dickson C.J.C., PSACv. The Queen, supra note 32
at 266.
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excessive level of aggregate demand is the cause of inflation. This,
however, does not stop the public from making the spurious
conclusion that inflation was solely a result of wage increases. As
Baumol points out:
Business managers and journalists are very likely to blame
inflation on rising wages. In a superficial sense, they are
right, because higher wages do indeed cause firms to raise
prices. But in a deeper sense they are wrong. Both rising
wages and rising prices are only symptoms of an
underlying malady: too much aggregate demand.
Blaming labour for inflation in such a case is a bit like
blaming high medical costs for making us ill.64
A challenge was made under s. 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill of
PSAC, the government was acting
capriciously and contrary to the "equality under the law" provision
of the Bill of Rights. 6 5 The Court, however, did not agree with this
interpretation. The Chief Justice wrote:

Rights alleging that in singling out

The leadership role of the government constitutes
justification for Parliament's legislative focus on the
public sector. It was, in the circumstances, permissible for
Parliament to decline to impose a universally applicable
short-term controls programme on a heterogeneous
labour force, and instead to limit its interference with the
collective bargaining process to a discrete and relatively
homogeneous group of employees. The employees in
question shared in common an employer perceived to
occupy the role of the national economic leader and
trendsetter. 66
When viewed from this perspective, PSAC was the logical choice.
The government was not acting arbitrarily, as the union charged,
but needed to set an example for the rest of the country. The
logical choice was its own unions. Aside from the fact that the
public sector was a "relatively homogeneous group," it was the

64 William Baumol et al., Economics: Principles and Policy-Macroeconomics,
Second Canadian Edition (Toronto: Harper Brace Jovanovich, 1988) at 207.
65 PSAC did not use s. 15 of the Charter as s. 32(2) delayed this section from
coming into effect for three years.
66 PSACv. The Queen, supra note 32 at 263.
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logical choice because their employer was viewed as the national
trendsetter.
There are several fallacies underlying the logic of this argument.
To best illustrate these fallacies, an analogy is apt. A principal of a
high school, who also teaches her own mathematics class, has
discovered that the mathematics scores for her school have fallen
below standard. Instead of opting for mandatory extra study for
the whole school, she decides to take her own class and make them
stay for an extra hour after school to study mathematics. This is
done in the hopes that the rest of the mathematics teachers in the
school will follow suit. An analogy is only as good as far as it is
similar to the actual situation; so, we are to assume that it is not the
principal' s class that drove the scores down but all the classes
together. In fact, we must assume that her particular class actually
had higher than average scores. (Between 1978 and 1982, the
federal government succeeded in obtaining lower wage settlements
with its employees than all of the other provinces and the private
sector). The logic is the same. The principal has a role as a leader
and her own class is the obvious choice to set the example. Two
more suppositions are necessary to round out the analogy. Previous
to this, when the mathematics scores fell below standard, she
simply mandated extra study time for all students. (During the
inflationary period of the early 1970s, the Trudeau government
legislated universal wage and price control measures). Further, at
the same time, she issued the edict that students in her class were
subject to harsher rules of discipline than other students. (Do not
forget that the legislation went beyond compensatory matters).
The logic of the principal's policy is undermined on several
counts. First, there is no reason to believe that the other
mathematics teachers will follow her lead. In fact, they are unlikely
to do so as they lack the coercive powers of the principal. Secondly,
the students in her class will be subject to extra duties despite the
fact that they played no part in lowering the scores. In spite of their
best efforts to raise the school's average, they are being unjustly
penalized while nothing is done about the other students who have
contributed to the substandard scores. Thirdly, because of this, it
will be assumed throughout the school that these students are at
fault for the lower scores and thus must not only suffer the extra
study but the ignominy of being blamed for the school's poor
showing. Also, it is apparent that the principal has used the
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opportunity of the lower mathematics scores, and her own powers
as principal, to gain more control over her own class. Finally, even if
the other teachers are able to order the extra study, the scores may
still not go up simply because the students may not be at fault.
Poor instruction on the part of the teachers or outdated textbooks
may be to blame.
When abstracted in this way, it is easier to see the fallacies of
what appears on the surface to be a very sensible policy. The
employer-employee aspect cannot be ignored, although it certainly
is not the whole picture. The public sector was treated unfairly and
it shared a disproportionate amount of the blame for the inflation.
It took on the brunt of the attempted remedy despite its own wage
concessions in the past. The policy seems particularly unjust in
retrospect as the union's sacrifice yielded little results. The only
ones who followed the federal lead were the provinces, and only six
of those, primarily because they were the only other employers who
had the coercive powers to force their employees to accept a harsh
wage package. It is an odd sense of fairness if those who have
excelled are penalized for the shortcomings of others. PSAC was not
the logical choice simply because it cannot be held responsible for
the inflationary situation. In forcing PSAC to bear the brunt of the
corrective measures, the federal government acted unfairly in
singling out a union that had already made concessions.
In relying on a questionable psychological effect, the federal
government showed its naivete. It is simply unreasonable to expect
employees to accept low wage increases in a period of runaway
inflation. Wilson J. pointed out the contradiction in trying to affect
voluntary wage constraint through coercion. "[It is] paradoxical for
the government to seek to inspire voluntary compliance by
imposing a programme of mandatory compliance. One might well
ask how this can be seen as setting an example of voluntary
compliance by either government or its employees." 67
Given the government's propensity for abusing its coercive
legislative powers when it comes to its own employees, the public
sector unions are in a particularly precarious position. This is why
the freedom to strike must be more vigilantly guarded in their case.
The prevailing mood seems to be that the public sector unions
should concern us the least because it is not a matter of the state
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PSACv. The Queen, ibid. at 272.
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interfering in the private sector but merely an internal, government
matter. However, on this argument, there is no reason why these
workers should be any more open to government abuse than those
in the private sector and there is even more compelling evidence
that they are more vulnerable to mistreatment.
It is difficult to leave an opening for the abrogation of the
freedom to strike when it would necessarily be a weak freedom at
best. If the freedom to strike was included under the freedom of
association, it would be subject to the notwithstanding clause. A
discussion of the merits of this clause is beyond this work, but
suffice it to say that it gives government a trump card to be played
whenever its policies are threatened with court action. Regardless of
whether a freedom to strike is included under the freedom of
association or appended in its own section, it would be subject to
s. l. This gives the government greater scope in abrogating rights
and freedoms.
All this being said, it must be recognized that public sector
unions are simply not in the same position as private sector unions.
The reason is that the government employees' fortunes are not tied
to the profitability of their employer in the same way that the
private sector employees' are. Contrary to the opinion of many
columnists and commentators, the government cannot, and should
not, be run as a business. Their employees do not have a vested selfinterest in assuring the profitability of their employer. The restraint
on private sector employees that keeps them from making
unreasonable demands does not apply to the public sector. The
government will not shut down and move south of the border
because its employees' wage demands were too high.
What effect does this have on the public sector's freedom to
strike? The public sector's precarious position still demands a special
diligence in ensuring it is not abused by government. Because the
government has been quick to use its powers to legislate its
employees back to work whenever they become too recalcitrant, it
is difficult to say what the result of an unimpeded freedom to
strike for government employees would be. It is doubtful that they
would be able to extort outrageous demands from the government.
A strike is still a very unpleasant affair for both sectors. If there is
one caveat to the argument, it would allow for compulsory
arbitration to be imposed if, and only if, a public sector union is
obviously and blatantly abusing its powers to force excessive
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demands from the government. It is important that the
governments' actions be as limited as possible here to prevent labour
abuses on its part. Further, there is no need for a special
constitutional provision for this caveat as the terms laid down by
the Supreme Court for a s. 1 challenge would be sufficient to cover
these rare circumstances.
4. Essential Services
The Alberta Reference dealt with the Alberta government's Labour
Relations Act 68 covering fire-fighters and hospital workers and the
Police Officers Collective Bargaining Act. 69 In this way, it brought up
the question of essential services. There are some workers who
provide a service (or product) so necessary to the public good that
to withdraw that service would jeopardize public safety. If these
workers were given an unlimited freedom to strike, their bargaining
power would be such that they could be reasonably expected to
exact far-reaching concessions in a labour dispute.
The essential question for liberalism is whether this constitutes
coercion. If the medical association decides it wants to triple its
salaries and refuses to treat any sick or dying patients until its
demands are met, it would be, in effect, threatening the public with
life or death. But would this be coercion and would the government
be allowed to intervene? The answer may not be as obvious as it
seems. Recall that liberals adhere to a strict doctrine of negative
rights: the individual cannot be compelled to come to the aid of
anyone regardless of whether she is a doctor, police officer or firefighter. This entails a separation between acts and omissions: the
individual who sets fire to someone's house can be held morally and
legally accountable for that act but the person who stands by idly
while the house burns without offering aid cannot be held
accountable for that omission.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus amongst liberals as to what
constitutes coercion.7° Given everything Rothbard has written, if
convinced of the efficacy of the freedom to strike, he would extend
these principles to essential service associations and not allow that
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the medical association was being coercive.7 1 Hayek, on the other
hand, would argue that the medical association was acting
coercively and would permit government intervention. It is not my
place here to settle this dispute for liberals.72
It may be argued that the matter is moot because I have already
argued that public sector employees may be subject to limitations
under s. 1. As essential services are provided by the government,
this would preclude excessive demands by unions providing
essential services. This is misleading, however, because the
government does not provide all essential services. For example, as
part of the justification for abrogating the freedom to strike for
dairy workers, it was argued that milk was essential to the public
health. This argument also does little to quell liberal concerns
because most liberals wish to have the government's involvement in
the provision of essential services reduced. The smaller the public
service and the more limited the state's involvement in essential
services, the more germane the discussion becomes.
If one is a classical liberal who, like Nozick, grounds one's
thoughts upon "natural rights," the discussion of essential services
really ends with the argument that the state cannot coerce anyone
to provide any service or product regardless of whether or not it is
essential. For other liberals who are willing to temper the freedom
to strike for workers in essential service industries, some questions
remain. The first problem is to define exactly what constitutes an
essential service. Liberals would want as confined a notion of
essential services as possible so as to limit the amount of state
coercion. The most restrictive definition would designate as
essential any service or product the removal of which would result
in the irreplaceable loss, a loss of life or property. This definition
would preclude doctors, nurses, police officers, fire fighters and
rescue workers, for example, from striking but could not apply to
dairy workers, teachers or hospital cleaning staff. It cannot be
argued that the loss of revenues by a company due to a strike could
not be recouped in the future. It is important to emphasize that the
key word is irreplaceable. Many essential service workers also
perform tasks that could not be considered essential under this
definition. Doctors must save people's lives but they may refuse to
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perform elective surgery. Police officers must prevent murders but
can stop writing parking tickets. A more controversial example
involves fire fighters who must rescue the person from their burning
home but refuse to save the house. The home is replaceable while
the person's life is not.
The definition adopted by the Supreme Court seems too openended. Dickson C.J.C. defines an essential service as "one the
interruption of which would threaten serious harm to the general
public or to a part of the population." 73 This is ambiguous because it
is unclear what would constitute "serious harm." It would cause one
serious harm to have one's house burn down but it is not
irreplaceable. Dickson C.J.C. does qualify his statement by saying
that, "[m]ere inconvenience to members of the public does not fall
within the ambit of the essential services justification for abrogating
the freedom to strike." 74 Again, however, it is unclear whether
something is a "mere inconvenience" or a "serious harm." Some
cases are clear: losing a leg because the doctor is on strike is serious
harm while having to take the subway because the bus drivers are on
strike is a mere inconvenience. However, the argument could be
made that the financial loss to an employer is not an inconvenience
but causes the firm serious harm. In any common usage of the
word, education is essential to a person's well-being. If teachers
went on strike and forced the closure of schools for several weeks,
would this constitute serious harm to the students? Certainly the
classes are replaceable in the sense that they can be made up for
during the summer break, but is this a mere inconvenience to the
students? Under the replaceability argument, neither of these
appeals could be made.
If an exception is to be made in the case of essential services, the
problem of how to deal with it constitutionally presents itself. The
presence of s. 1 makes any special constitutional provision
unnecessary. The Supreme Court has already stated that if a
constitutional guarantee were given to the freedom to strike under
the freedom of association, it would necessarily be subject to
limitation in the case of essential services by s. 1. 7 5 Liberals are not
fond of limitations to their rights; however, the Supreme Court has
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set the test for a s. 1 challenge and it is fairly rigorous in its
application. This mechanism is already in place. Having exceptions
to the freedom to strike covered under its aegis affords the least
amount of tampering with the existing constitution. The concern is
that if these limitations are accommodated by other means, this
would throw open the process and the exceptions may be judged
by a standard less rigorous than s. 1.
The final concern is that existing definition of essential services
is too lenient. If the limitation is imposed, the definition should be
narrower and clearer. It should be noted that the definition
discussed was contained in the minority opinion. Dickson C.J.C.
allowed that the freedom to strike was contained in s. 2(d) and
from there proceeded to discuss limitations. The majority, of
course, did not allow the freedom to strike and therefore saw no
need to discuss limitations. This gives the Court greater leeway to
amend its definition in future decisions.
Striking is a freedom and, moreover, it is a negative freedom of
non-interference. The thinking liberal would agree that the
government has no place in the area of labour negotiations.
Mcintyre J., based his decision on a puzzling belief that he was
remaining neutral and that there was no individual equivalent to the
freedom to strike. Once these fallacious assumptions are set aside, it
can be seen that the freedom to strike is not out of step with
liberalism. If this freedom is to be secured for all unionized
employees, it should be accommodated under the freedom of
association. The public service poses more difficulties than the
private sector; however, they are the most susceptible to coercion
simply because they have the only employer who can legislate
against them. In extending a limited freedom to strike to essential
services workers, care must be taken that the special obligation of
these workers is properly balanced with their personal freedom.

V. CONCLUSION
The cry comes from blighted unionized and non-unionized workers
alike that their employers have ignored their interests and should
have taken better care of them. Indignation runs high, even to the
point of insisting that the employer has a moral responsibility to
take care of her employees. Liberals have argued that employers do
not have any ethical responsibility to ensure the well-being of their
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employees. In fact, it is improper and inefficient to have the
employer look out for the interests of her employees. No one
knows the employee's interests better than the employee himself,
not his company and certainly not the government. This is a lesson
unionists must learn if they are to survive the move to liberalism.
What liberals must understand is that the best and most
efficient way for workers to ensure their own well-being, given all
the power imbalances inherent in the free market, is through an
association with their fellow workers. There is nothing illiberal
about this. The moral imperative of liberalism demands that
workers take care of their own well-being and not rely upon their
employers to do so. Charity is accepted by most liberals, but the
worker cannot and should not depend upon the altruism of her
employer. This philosophical argument compels individuals to go
about achieving their goals, without coerced assistance, by the most
effective, non-coercive means possible. As businesses, in general,
have a poor record on maintaining and enhancing their employees'
liberties, the initiative then falls to the employees to set their own
goals and achieve these for themselves.
The liberal who objects to workers presenting a united front to
their employer has not properly considered the key role freedom of
association has played in liberalism. This freedom was conceived by
liberals as a reaction against attempts by the state to divide its
critics and deny them the strength that comes from unity. The
right to associate freely with one's fellow men and women who
share common interests or concerns has become indispensable to
the smooth functioning of a liberal democracy and the preservation
of personal liberty. In a large, modern democracy, an individual
simply cannot effectively oppose the state by herself. Nor can
citizens be expected to achieve those reasonable goals they have set
for themselves if the state is permitted to atomize individuals
because those goals are not consonant with the majority's or those
of a special interest.
The question becomes what is the best way to protect workers
from the coercive powers of the state. With a constitution that does
not recognize the freedom to strike, and constitutional change
embroiled in a demanding amending formula, the most promising
solution is a Supreme Court decision that recognizes the place of
the freedom to strike within the freedom of association. For many
liberals, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an imperfect
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document. The Supreme Court's formulation of the freedom of
association makes an imperfect document intolerable. Had the
Court fulfilled its promise to give a broad interpretation to the
rights set out in the Charter so as to secure the maximum amount
of liberty for Canadians, this work would have been significantly,
and gladly, shorter.
Many liberals have a very critical view of the state, believing it
too quick to abuse its coercive powers. Certainly when governments
have dealt with their own employees, they have lived up to this
view. If liberals are to advocate the freedom to strike, they must be
particularly vigilant in the case of public sector employees and not
shun the disputes of these workers as an internal government affair.
When governments become willing to exploit this coercive ability,
then those workers who fall remotely into the category of essential
service workers should take heed. Because these workers often draw
the electorate in as a third party to the dispute, the state frequently
reacts quickly and forcefully in denying these workers their
freedoms.
When dealing with two vast topics, unionism and liberalism,
one could easily write a three-volume set. The necessity to cut out
much that might have proven enlightening is always a difficult task.
Trying to pare liberalism down to its essentials is a bit like deaning
the Augean Stables. One major component of liberalism I have
virtually ignored is welfare state liberalism. Welfare liberalism is a
more moderate theory than the polar theories of socialism and
classical liberalism and perhaps would have been easier to defend.
The problem with this is that it is not a welfare liberal framework
under which the industrialized nations are operating but a classical
liberal one. A reconciliation of welfare liberalism and unionism
would have been impertinent because the dominant political and
economic theory of the time is classical liberalism.
While I am a strong defender of union rights, I do not,
however, pretend that unions are ideal organizations without flaws.
One of their flaws, as I have pointed out, is their reliance on socialist
rhetoric. The "evils of capitalism" argument has always failed to
impress me and I am sure that it does little to win the public over to
their cause. Hopefully I have shown unionists that there is more to
be gained in keeping the government out of their affairs than in
working to increase the state's prerogative in labour relations. I can
also cite numerous examples of poor judgment on the part of
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unions. The early history of unions was often violent and there are
enough modern examples to make an impressive list. None of these
individual cases, however, convince me that unionism, as an
institution, is not worth maintaining. One can criticize the means
without calling into question the ends.
This work was primarily directed at two audiences: liberals (in
order to convince them of the need to endorse union rights within
their ideology) and unionists (in order to convince them of the
need to accept some tenets of liberalism). The difficulty is that
unionists will likely agree with my conclusions and object to the
methodology. Conversely, liberals will agree with the methodology
but abjure the conclusions and, thus, neither side is satisfied.
However, my hope is that at the very least I have given both sides a
great deal to consider, and begun the process of discussion between
these divergent forces.

